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The Future Debate on Multidisciplinary
Practice in the United States
Sydney M. Cone, III*
A. Introduction
On 11 July 2000, the American Bar Association (ABA), through its House of Delegates,
took two votes relating to multidisciplinary practice (MDP), which effectively
repudiated the position recommended by the American Bar Association's (ABA)
Commission on MDP (the ABA Commission). The first vote rejected a procedural
motion, supported by the ABA Commission to defer a vote on the merits. The second
vote approved a Recommendation sponsored by several state bar associations which
were substantively opposed to the position of the ABA Commission. The second vote
also put an end to the existence of the ABA Commission.1
For two years, the ABA Commission had been seeking to persuade the House of
Delegates to approve MDP in what might be called its ultimate form - a form
whereby non-legal professionals would be permitted to own legal practices. In 1999,
the ABA Commission proposed that such an MDP should be permitted, provided it
was required to certify annually to a state court that it had complied with the rules
governing the legal profession, and was subject to 'administrative audit' by the
court.2 In 2000, the ABA Commission, abandoning its 1999 approach, indicated that
compliance with those rules by such an MDP '[could] be satisfied in a variety of
* C.V. Starr, Professor of Law, New York Law School, Attorney at Law, New York;
Counsel and former partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Vice Chairman of the
NYSBA Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation.
The motion to defer was defeated by a vote of 262 against, 152 for. The second vote was on
a Recommendation (in the form of Report 1OF to the House of Delegates) by bar
associations of (in alphabetical order) Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio.
It was approved by a vote of 314 in favour, 106 against. It is summarized in the text two
paragraphs below.
2 ABA Commission, Report No. 109 to the House of Delegates, issued in June and dated
August 1999. On 10 August 1999, the House of Delegates declined to adopt the Report
and, by a vote of 304 to 98, resolved that no change should be made in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct as they relate to MDP 'unless and until additional study
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest ..
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ways', and effectively recommended that the several states select from amongst that
variety the way or ways that the states deemed best. 3
Neither the 1999 nor the 2000 proposal of the ABA Commission was voted on as
such by the House of Delegates. Instead, by approving resolutions proposed by state
bar groups, the House indicated that the proposals of the ABA Commission were
inadequate. In 1999, the House cited a need for more study of the issues relating to
MDP and the legal profession. In 2000, the House adopted a more detailed
resolution clearly disapproving - as incompatible with the 'core values of the legal
profession' - of MDPs in respect of which non-lawyers or non-legal entities 'have
any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or supervisory right, power
or position in connection with, the practice of law by any lawyer or law firm'. 4
The votes by the House of Delegates, while decisive, may not prove to be
definitive. Within the American legal profession, the MDP debate can be expected to
continue against the background of the steps taken by the House. Of these steps,
perhaps more important than the House's indication that the ABA Commission had
failed to come up with adequate proposals, was the House's removal of the ABA
Commission from the debate - a step that may encourage lawyers within both the
ABA and state bar groups to become more analytical in dealing with MDP.
The MDP debate in the US has focused in large part on two different types of MDP:
" One type has its economic centre of gravity in a sponsoring non-legal
professional firm, notably one of the firms known as the Big Five, 5 seeking to
extend its activities to include the practice of law.
" The other type comprises a variety of MDPs proposed by legal practitioners
seeking to combine the practice of law with other professional activities.
Conceptually, these two types of MDP overlap. As a practical matter, however, they
are rather different, and it is this difference which the ABA Commission largely
failed to analyze, and which may inform the future debate.
The difference turns on the likelihood of whether the practice of law in the MDP
will be effectively controlled by lawyers or non-lawyers. In an MDP whose economic
centre of gravity lies within a preponderantly dominant non-legal entity, that entity's
dominance alone may dictate that the locus of control of legal practice by the MDP
will reside with non-lawyers. In contrast, in MDPs of the second type, legal
practitioners may be more likely to control or exercise ultimate influence over the
economics of the MDP and thus of its legal practice.
The question of economic control of legal practice becomes highly pertinent in the
context of the rules governing the legal profession, and the place of that profession in
ABA Commission, Recommendation and Report to the House of Delegates, 12 May 2000;
see especially paras 4 and 6 of the Report.
4 See supra note 1.
5 The Big Five are Arthur Andersen; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; Ernst & Young; KPMG;
PricewaterhouseCoopers.
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the legal system. Put simply, the question becomes: to what extent is it reasonable to
expect MDPs of each type to act in furtherance of those rules and that system?
The ABA Commission did not ignore this question. It simply did not deal with it
in a way suggesting that it had received complete and coherent analysis. The
approach adopted by the ABA Commission seems to have been to consider
submissions made to it by persons appearing before it, but to produce no published
synthesis of those submissions, and to refrain from announcing the norms and
procedures used by it in evaluating the submissions and reaching its conclusions.
The gap in this process was the absence of any published analysis connecting the
submissions generated outside the ABA Commission with the conclusions reached
within it. Thus, the various ways and contexts in which economic control by non-
lawyers might impinge on the professional conduct of lawyers and on the legal system
itself (although covered in some of the submissions received by the ABA Commission)
went essentially unexamined in the Reports and Recommendations produced by the
ABA Commission. Most importantly, the ABA Commission made no effort to deal
with the difference between the two types of MDP mentioned above, that is, between an
MDP sponsored by an economically dominant non-legal entity, on the one hand, and,
on the other, MDPs in which legal professionals would be likely to exercise economic
control or ultimate economic influence in managing legal practice by the MDP.
This analytical gap produced a fatal discontinuity between the ABA Commis-
sion's apparent conclusion and its recommendations. In essence, it seems to have
concluded that 'an MDP that was not controlled by lawyers might, if left to its own
devices, be less likely than a law firm to create a firm 'culture' that was supportive of
strict observance of the rules of professional conduct'. 6 Thus stated, the problem was
how to assure, in an MDP controlled by non-lawyers, strict observance of the rules
of professional conduct applicable to legal practice by the MDP. In 1999 (as
mentioned above), the ABA Commission proposed that such an MDP would certify
annually to a court that it had complied with those rules, and that such an MDP
would be subject to 'administrative audit' by the court. This recommendation lacked
a realistic connection with the problem it presumably was seeking to solve. Widely
viewed as a clumsy contrivance not readily susceptible of legislative or judicial
application, this recommendation was withdrawn by the ABA Commission in 2000.
The Commission then failed to come up with any specific recommendation for
solving the problem inherent in its own conclusion (as discussed above).
The problem inherent in the apparent conclusion of the ABA Commission may lie
in the duality of its objectives. First, it insisted on authorizing MDP in what might be
called its ultimate form (that is, as mentioned above, MDPs in which legal practice is
effectively owned by economically dominant non-legal entities). Secondly, it aspired to
6 It is necessary to look outside the official texts issued by the ABA Commission to find a
statement of its conclusion on this key point. The quoted language is from an article written
by a member of the ABA Commission, Steven C. Nelson. It is the lead article in the
Summer 1999 issue of an ABA publication, International Law News.
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strict observance of the rules of professional conduct applicable to legal practice. The
failure of the ABA Commission to come up with a specific recommendation in 2000
may simply reflect its failure to resolve the contradictory nature of its dual objective.
Against this background, the following section examines certain schools of
thought that have found expression in the MDP debate in the US.
B. US Schools of Thought Relating to MDP
Five of the schools of thought in the US on issues involving MDP and the practice of
law are: the law and economics school; the approach advocated by the Big Five,
which would attach legal professional responsibility to individual lawyers but not
their MDP employers; the statement of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, favouring MDPs deemed to be in the public interest; the flatly negative
approach adopted by several state bar associations; and analysis grounded in the law
governing lawyers, as developed in a report by the New York State Bar Association.
They are examined in order below.
L The Law and Economics School
The approach toward MDP advocated by the law and economics school, briefly
stated, is that the availability of legal services to consumers should be dictated by the
marketplace, unrestricted by barriers in the form of rules governing the legal
profession. Those rules are viewed as 'no different from [those of] any other trade
union or interest group pursuing economic protectionism'. Advocates of those rules
are said to be 'lawyers defending their economic turf.
7
There is a certain intellectual purity to this school of thought. It holds that the
ownership of legal practice should be viewed primarily as a function of economic
determinism. Thus, whenever legal practitioners or public authorities adopt
regulatory measures relating to the practice of law, they should subordinate those
measures to the principle of free movement of capital into the practice of law.
It should be noted that the law and economics school is quite selective in its choice
of economic considerations that may be taken into account when one is dealing with
legal practice. The paramount economic consideration (according to this school) is
freedom of ownership and investment, uncomplicated by any consideration of how
this freedom may produce different professional consequences in different economic
7 The quotations are from, respectively, Daniel R. Fischel, 'Multidisciplinary Practice,
Seminar in Law and Economics' at Harvard Law School, 21 March 2000; and testimony of
James C. Turner before the ABA Commission. For the view that protectionism motivates
the legal profession in its reaction to MDP, see also, Tunku Varadarajan, 'Why is the ABA
Afraid of a Little Competition for Lawyers?' (2000) Wall Street Journal, at A27, 24 July.
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contexts. In particular, this school is indifferent to potential variation in professional
consequences flowing from the economics of ownership when legal practices are
owned by, respectively:
(1) lawyers;
(2) conglomerate professional enterprises controlled by non-lawyers; and
(3) non-professional investors.
Strictly speaking, this school of thought is not concerned with multidisciplinarity, but
with the ownership of legal practice in any context, be it unidisciplinary (a conventional
stand-alone legal practice), or multidisciplinary (a legal practice integrated with other
professional disciplines), or polycommercial (a legal practice integrated with other
business pursuits). The premise of freedom of ownership of legal practice, thus espoused,
is that the market will determine, efficiently and appropriately, which form of ownership
is to be rewarded by consumers purchasing legal services. In order for the market to
perform this function, consumers of legal services, it is argued, must be free to acquire
them from legal practices owned in those forms that the market elects to reward.
The law and economics school, being essentially unconcerned with multi-
disciplinarity, would permit non-professional investors to become owners of legal
practices. 8 It thus would carry the concept of integration beyond the type of
integrated MDP proposed by the ABA Commission in its 1999 and 2000 Reports
(referred to above), and would permit passive portfolio investors, as well as non-
professional business or commercial enterprises, to own or invest in the practice of
law. (The ABA Commission stated in its Reports that it was opposed to non-
professional ownership of, or passive investment in, legal practice. 9 ) Were the views
of the law and economics school to be adopted, banks, insurance companies, retail
enterprises, travel agencies, business conglomerates (among others) could acquire
law firms; and law firms themselves would be free to issue their own equity securities
to outside investors through private placements or public offerings.
The potential reach of law and economics thinking is thus quite extensive. To
realize its potential, this school of thought would not encumber itself unduly with
questions of reconciling non-lawyer control of legal practice with legal rules of
professional ethics. It is (as mentioned above) a philosophy of considerable
intellectual purity, ordaining that professional rules must simply give way whenever
their enforcement would impinge upon the mobility of capital investment into the
practice of law. It seems safe to observe that attaining this level of purity in practice-
transforming law and economics theory into a matrix of legal practice - would
require substantial modification of existing rules governing the practice of law.
8 A seminal work in this respect is Adams and Matheson, 'Law Firms on the Big Board?: A
Proposal for Non-lawyer Investment in Law Firms' (1998) 86 CalifL Rev 1.
9 For a study of MDP reaching the opposite conclusion and recommending passive
investment in law firms in France, see the Rapport Nallet, Les R~seaux Pluridisciplinaires et
les Professions du Droit (Paris, 1999).
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II. The Approach Advocated by the Big Five
The views of the Big Five on MDP are a subset of law and economics doctrine - a
subset tailored, quite understandably, to their own business objectives.' 0 In light of
those objectives, the Big Five do not seem to espouse investment by non-professionals
in the practice of law. Rather, the approach of the Big Five seems limited to seeking
those changes in rules of the legal profession necessary to accommodate the
acquisition and control of legal practices by the Big Five themselves, that is, by those
professions other than law, notably accounting, in which the Big Five now engage or
might engage in the future. On the other hand, it seems clear that the Big Five intend
to own and control legal practices within integrated MDPs in which non-lawyers
would have, and lawyers would not have, a preponderant economic interest and
ultimate decision-making authority. Thus, a major objective of the Big Five is to
modify or eliminate, as necessary, professional rules that inhibit or prohibit non-
lawyers from owning, investing in, or controlling legal practices - that is, to change
those rules in a manner that would permit non-legal professionals and non-legal
professional entities to own, invest in, and control firms engaged in the practice of law,
and to create integrated MDPs subsuming legal practices.
Such changes have been resisted by the legal profession including (as discussed
above) by the ABA House of Delegates, on the ground that they would threaten the
core values of the legal profession. In the Recommendation adopted by the House on
11 July 2000, these values were expressed as including the following duties of the
lawyer:
(1) to manifest undivided loyalty to the client;
(2) competently to exercise independent legal judgment for the benefit of the
client;
(3) to hold client confidences inviolate;
(4) to avoid conflicts of interest with the client;
(5) to help maintain a single profession of law, with responsibilities as a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and as a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.
The Big Five (apart from suggesting, along with the law and economics school, that
concern for professional core values is window-dressing for professional protection-
10 Sources used in arriving at the views of the Big Five on MDP include: testimony before the
ABA Commission, particularly that of Kathryn Oberly of Ernst & Young on 4 February
1999; the July 1999 statement of the Big Five on the 1999 Report of the ABA Commission
(entitled, 'By Dramatically Expanding the Definition of the "Practice of Law", the MDP
Commission Transforms Bar Associations into Super-Regulators with Vast Control over
Industries and Organizations Never Before Subject to Lawyers' Rules and Bar Discipline');
and Big Five papers issued outside the US, particularly Juri-Avenir, 'R~pondre aux
Attentes du March& un Plan d'Action Qualit& pour l'Audit en Europe' (1996); Juri-Avenir,
'L'Exercice de la Profession d'Avocat en R~seau Pluridisciplinaire' (1998).
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ism), have argued that the duties referred to in the preceding paragraph are the
duties of individual lawyers acting in an individual professional capacity, and are not
duties binding on a Big Five firm, as such, when it employs lawyers held out to the
public as engaging in the practice of law. This position of the Big Five represents a
crucial point in the American debate over MDP. Were it to be adopted, a non-legal
entity (such as a Big Five firm) engaged in the practice of law would be exonerated
from the professional discipline to which individual lawyers are held."'
This argument - that only individual lawyers, but not non-legal entities
controlling legal practices, should be subject to the rules governing the legal
profession - has served to focus attention on two features of proposals for MDPs
owned or otherwise controlled by non-lawyers. The first was jurisdictional: while
legal practitioners are subject to supervision and discipline by the courts, no
mechanism exists for giving the courts jurisdiction over non-lawyers controlling legal
practices, or even for determining what constitutes such control. The second was
substantive: if, in respect of their control of legal practices, non-legal entities were to
be subject to professional rules and discipline, what would be the content of those
rules and of measures relating to their enforcement?
The Big Five, by declining to come forward with suggestions that would facilitate
resolving these issues, were themselves seen to be engaged in a form of protectionism.
Their argument that only their individual lawyers would be subject to the rules and
discipline of the legal profession could be characterized as, first, an argument for
protecting themselves against the rules and discipline of the very profession whose
economic benefits they sought by proposing to offer legal services to the general
public, and, second, an attempt to put those individual lawyers at risk for carrying
out the business plans of their employers. Critics of the Big Five position foresaw
tensions between the non-lawyers with ultimate authority over a Big Five MDP but
no accountability under the rules governing the legal profession, and the lawyers in a
subordinate position within the MDP responsible for helping to realize those
business plans by offering legal services to the public, while charged with respecting
the rules of their profession applicable to such services.
These tensions were most apparent in the debate over whether legal professional
rules on conflicts of interest would apply throughout an integrated Big Five MDP
offering legal services to the public. The Big Five argued that they should not be
subject to legal conflicts rules, and should be permitted to handle conflicting
assignments by using internal devices, known as screens or Chinese Walls, that
would separate a firm's professionals handling one client's problems from that firm's
professionals handling the problems of a client with interests conflicting with those
of the first client. This argument was met with considerable skepticism by legal
i In, e.g., New York, not only lawyers but also law firms are expressly subject to professional
rules governing the legal profession. See NY Disciplinary Rules 1-104(a) and 5-105(e), 29
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York. On this and related points generally, see
Bernard Wolfman's Testimony to the ABA Commission, 12 March 1999.
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commentators, who were able to point to contemporaneous court decisions rejecting
as ethically inadequate such internal screening by the Big Five.
12
One commentator suggested that the type of legal practice being sought by the Big
Five could be accommodated by creating a two-tier legal profession. 13 Legal
practices fully subject to the rules governing the practice of law would in effect
constitute a separate profession, and the only profession entitled to hold itself out as
fully protective of the interests of its clients. MDP legal practices that offered a lesser
level of client protection would not be entitled to hold themselves out as full-fledged
members of the legal profession. This proposal has not found substantial support in
the course of the MDP debate, but provides a striking illustration of the issues raised
by the debate.
IIL Statement by the New York City Bar Association
In July 1999, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) issued a
statement on MDP which it affirmed in June 2000 (the ABCNY Statement). 14 The
ABCNY Statement generally endorsed MDP and the position thereon taken in 1999
by the ABA Commission, but contained two special features that merit comment in
the overall context of the American debate on MDP.
First, the ABCNY Statement de-emphasized MDPs comprising accountants and
lawyers, that is, MDPs advocated by the Big Five. (Similarly, the ABA Commission
in its Reports played down Big Five MDPs and emphasized small MDPs of lawyers
and non-lawyers acting as advisers to the elderly. The hearings held by the ABA
Commission, however, made it clear that it was dealing in major part with Big Five
MDPs. In contrast, the ABCNY held no hearings and, in its internal deliberations,
limited to two committees, did not focus on MDPs involving the Big Five.)
Secondly, the ABCNY suggested that the answer to the question of what
professional rules would apply to MDPs could be found in a synthesis of the
different professional rules governing the different professions deemed eligible to
12 E.g., UK House of Lords Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG (18 November and 18 December 1998). A more recent case
in which Ernst & Young's French law firm found itself on both sides of a case and faced
disqualification by a US federal court is discussed Tax Notes, 31 July 2000, pp. 611-16.
Senior staff members of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have also
taken a position inconsistent with Big Five views on conflicts of interest. Letter to the
President of the ABA from the Chief Counsel, Chief Accountant, and the Director of
Enforcement of the SEC, 12 July 1999. See also 'Auditory discomfort' (2000) The
Economist, at p. 78 (15 January).
13 Statement of L. Harold Levinson to the New York State Bar Association, 13 May 1999.
14 Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, 'The Record of the ABCNY' (1999),
at p. 585, September/October. The author, a member of the ABCNY's Special Committee
on MDP, dissented from reaffirmation of the ABCNY Statement in 2000. Among other
things he found it curious that the ABCNY in 2000, unlike the ABA Commission in 2000,
continued to endorse the 1999 position of the ABA Commission.
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form MDPs. The MDPs envisaged by the ABCNY would include, in addition to
lawyers, such professionals as architects, environmental engineers, and social
workers. (The ABCNY Statement did not purport to set out an exhaustive list of
MDP-eligible professions, nor did it propose criteria for the selection of professions
that might be included on such a list.) The ABCNY Statement urged the ABA (not
the ABCNY itself, but the ABA), in co-ordination with other professional bodies, to
develop a common set of professional rules that might govern MDPs. For its part,
the ABA has shown little inclination to undertake this task. Were it to do so, it
presumably would initiate a programme for:
(1) devising a series of rules that would apply to various MDPs comprising
specified professions; and
(2) identifying and granting authority to the bodies responsible for enforcing
those rules.
The ABCNY proposal is grounded in the conviction that a social need exists for,
e.g., MDPs comprising lawyers and social workers, and that the legal profession has
a corresponding duty to fill this need. The clients of such an MDP would,
presumably, be entitled to the protections inherent in the fiduciary relationship of
lawyer to client - or, as it is frequently put, the protections inherent in the core values
of the legal profession. Thus, the umbrella professional rules for an MDP comprising
lawyers and social workers would need to protect client confidences, to assure
loyalty to clients, to avoid conflicts of interest, to safeguard the lawyer's competence
and the independence of the lawyer's judgment in handling legal matters for the
client, and to take appropriate account of the lawyer's role in the legal system.
With respect to the ABCNY example of an MDP comprising lawyers and social
workers, it seems possible that the social workers might have to be treated as
affiliated with the lawyers for purposes of applying legal professional standards of
the type just adverted to. In addition, legislative or judicial action might be required
in order to subject all of the professionals in such an MDP to the supervisory and
disciplinary authority of an administrative or judicial body. In brief, if it is assumed
that the ABCNY has properly identified a compelling social need (or a congeries of
compelling social needs represented by an aggregate of MDPs involving various
professions), considerable work may be involved in developing:
(1) suitable rules for the professionals in an MDB attempting to fulfill the social
goals in question; and
(2) means for assuring their enforcement.
In the case of MDPs involving the Big Five, the Big Five themselves (so long as they
continue to think they will find it advantageous to offer legal services to the public)
can be expected to devote their own resources, and may cause others to devote
resources, to questions involving the types of integrated MDP that are of interest to
them. It is less clear, however, that commensurate resources will be devoted to
promoting the types of MDP advocated by the ABCNY. Issuing a statement
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describing a perceived social need is not the same thing as undertaking the steps
required (or thought to be required) in order to fill that social need. It remains to be
seen whether the objectives sought by the ABCNY will attract the resources needed
to realize those objectives.
IV. The Flatly Negative School Regarding MDP
Bar associations in several US jurisdictions seem prepared to oppose for the
foreseeable future any changes whatsoever in the rules governing the legal profession
if the changes would permit MDP. In terms of intellectual purity, this school of
thought, the flatly negative school,' 5 is the opposing counterpart to the law and
economics school (discussed above). The flatly negative school sees any involvement
of non-lawyers in the practice of law as a threat to the core values of the legal
profession (as outlined in Report 1OF adopted, as discussed above, on 11 July 2000
by the ABA House of Delegates), that is, as a threat which, if realized, would bring
about a substantial erosion of those values.
Flat negativism is often too simplistic to be maintained in the face of the realities
of legal practice. One of these realities is that lawyers, in order to practice law, often
need to engage the professional or other services of non-lawyers - services of various
types (those, for example, of environmental engineers) subsumed in the debate over
MDP. It is not uncommon for lawyers and law firms to carry out their work with the
aid of ancillary arrangements involving such non-legal services. Many US states
countenance these arrangements, and in some cases have adopted legal professional
rules that permit them.
16
In addition, such ancillary arrangements not only are often necessary for the
effective practice of law, but also can shade into difficult conceptual areas not readily
dealt with through flat negativism in respect of MDP. An MDP that is effectively the
economic preserve of lawyers is, analytically, not readily distinguishable from the
law firm that uses non-lawyer professionals in carrying out its legal practice. The
enforcement of flat negativism, moreover, requires the enforcer to have always at
hand a workable and relevant definition of the practice of law; and such a definition
has often proved elusive.
17
Flat negativism also invites direct confrontations between its advocates and the
advocates of MDP. These confrontations might in theory be winnable on the basis of
the forceful logic and professional rules of the former (of advocates defending the
legal profession and opposing MDP), but these confrontations might in practice turn
into strategic contests winnable less through logic than by raw economic power.
Advocates of MDP might in fact prefer to deal with flat negativism than with a more
15 What is herein called the flatly negative school is popularly referred to as the 'just say no'
school.
16 E.g., Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.7.
17 See, e.g., Washington State Bar Association, Committee to Define the Practice of Law,
'Final Report', 13 July 1999.
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sophisticated appreciation of the issues relating to MDP. Seeking out points of
weakness in the doctrine of flat negativism and throwing substantial economic
resources into disputes involving those points of weakness, the advocates of MDP
might find it possible to characterize the legal profession as in fact unduly
protectionist, and thereby to win judicial or legislative support for measures
favourable to MDP.
V. The April 2000 Report of the New York State Bar Association
Beginning in June 1999, the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) had been
concerned about perceived analytical deficiencies in the work of the ABA
Commission and, in July 1999, the NYSBA had created its own Special Committee
on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation (the NYSBA Committee).1 8 In
April 2000, the NYSBA Committee issued its Report entitled 'Preserving the Core
Values of the Legal Profession: The Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law
Governing Lawyers' (the NYSBA Report).' 9
As the title of the NYSBA Report suggests, it approaches MDP from the point of
view of the law governing lawyers in the US - not only statutes and professional
rules, but also the considerable body of judge-made law constituting much of the
common law of legal practice. Its announced purpose is to present a study of the
factual predicates of the MDP debate, and to make specific recommendations as to
what should and should not be changed in the law governing lawyers in order, in the
public interest, to clarify the place of MDP in that law while, at the same time,
preserving the core values of the legal profession.
The NYSBA Report considers ownership of legal practice to constitute control of
legal practice, and recommends that MDP not be permitted in a form in which non-
lawyers would have ownership or investment interests. 20 The form of MDP
recommended by the NYSBA Report (in addition to lawyer ownership of services
ancillary to the practice of law) 2 1 is a so-called 'side-by-side' affiliation. This (as set
out in the NYSBA Report) is an affiliation in which a law firm and a non-legal
professional service firm enter into and maintain a contractual relationship for the
purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and continuing basis, legal services
18 The NYSBA Committee has 12 members, plus advisors and liaison officials. Robert
MacCrate is its Chair; the current President-elect of the NYSBA, Steven C. Krane, and the
author are its Vice Chairs; John D. Leubsdorf is its Reporter.
19 The NYSBA Report (pp. 388 et seq. and appendices) is obtainable from the NYSBA,
Albany, NY.
20 Non-lawyers and non-legal professional service firms affiliated with lawyers and law firms
would not be permitted 'to obtain, hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership or
investment interest in, or managerial or supervisory right, power or position in connection
with, the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm'. The term 'ownership or investment
interest' is defined to include 'any form of debt or equity'. Proposed New York
Disciplinary Rule 1-107(A)(2), (B)(2), NYSBA Report, at pp. 352-353.
21 See ibid., at pp. 336-337 (proposed New York Disciplinary Rule 1-106).
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performed by the law firm, as well as other professional services. The NYSBA
Report makes it clear, however, that, in such an affiliation between a law firm and a
non-legal professional service firm, the latter should not be permitted to play a role
in deciding whether to provide legal services in a particular matter or to a particular
client, or in the hiring and training of lawyers, or in assigning lawyers to handle
particular matters, or in decisions relating to pro bono publico and other public-
interest legal work, or in financial matters relating to legal practice, or in the
compensation or advancement of lawyers. 2
2
As thus proposed by the NYSBA Report, a 'side-by-side' MDP falls far short of
the type of integrated MDP sought by the Big Five (as discussed above), yet
represents a significant departure from the school that is flatly opposed to any form
of MDP (as also discussed above). Thus, the NYSBA Report would seem designed
to make unhappy both the strongest of the proponents of integrated MDPs (the Big
Five23 and the law and economics school), and the opponents to any type of MDP.
(It has also failed to win the support of the ABCNY, which, since July 1999, has
declined to abandon the June 1999 position of the ABA Commission (abandoned by
the Commission itself in 2000), and which seems unable to adapt to the reality
presented by the issuance of the NYSBA Report.
Despite its seemingly having arrived on the scene to present a displeasing target to
a wide array of participants in the US debate on MDP, the NYSBA Report rather
clearly played a positive role in the deliberations of the ABA House of Delegates
leading up to the adoption, on 11 July 2000, of a Recommendation by the House
consonant with the NYSBA Report, and the simultaneous termination of the ABA
Commission by the House. There would seem to be two explanations for the positive
role of the NYSBA Report in this regard. First, it filled the analytical vacuum
created by the work of the ABA Commission in 1999 and 2000, and in particular was
responsive to the call by the ABA House of Delegates, on 10 August 1999, for
'additional study' of the issues relating to MDP.2 4 (The additional study supplied by
the NYSBA Report comprised six chapters (122 pp.) of appraisal of the American
legal profession, four chapters (165 pp.) on the challenges to maintaining a single
public profession of law,25 and two chapters (73 pp. plus appendices) of analysis of
the principal issues together with specific recommendations.) Secondly, the NYSBA
Report, completed in April and distributed in early May 2000, was timed to be
22 See ibid., at Chapter 12 and Appendices (beginning at p. 325) for its discussion of its
recommendations.
23 Two of the Big Five are in litigation with the Netherlands Bar in Europe over the issue of
whether integrated MDPs should be permitted. The case is now pending before the
European Court of Justice. See Case C-309/99, C 299/15-16 [1999] Official Journal of the
24 European Communities (16 October).Reacting to the 1999 Report of the ABA Commission, the ABA House of Delegates so
resolved by a vote of 304 to 98.
25 One of these four chapters (pp. 185-291) consisted of a survey of MDP in 12 countries
outside the US.
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available to members of the ABA House of Delegates preparing to consider MDP on
II July 2000 (as discussed above).26 It would seem, therefore, that both the content
and the timing of the NYSBA Report contributed to the positive reception that it
received from many participants in the mid-2000 US debate on MDP.
One aspect of the content of the NYSBA Report would seem to merit comment in
explaining the role it played in the mid-2000 debate. In contrast to the ABA
Commission and the ABCNY, the NYSBA Report challenged the nature of MDP
being promoted by the Big Five. According to the NYSBA Report, a Big Five MDP
resembles not so much professionals from different professions working closely
together and guided by enforceable codes of conduct, as it resembles virtually
unregulated services offered by giant business conglomerates which, as regards the
lawyers in their employ, tend to be indifferent to their actual status in the legal
profession. 27 A conclusion that can be reached from this analysis is that the Big Five
may indeed offer, or seek to offer, the co-ordinated services of more than one
profession, but they are also interested in acquiring ownership and control of the
unidisciplinary practice of law for its own sake, and they pursue this interest in a
manner that raises serious questions relating to the title topics of the NYSBA
Report: the core values of the American legal profession; and the place of MDP in
the law governing lawyers. The NYSBA Report thus provided substantive analysis
for those participants in the mid-2000 debate who were inclined neither to accept nor
to let pass in silence claims being made in respect of MDP as promoted by the Big
Five.
While it can be said that the NYSBA Report proved relevant to the mid-2000 US
debate on MDP and, in particular, the 11 July 2000 votes by the ABA House of
Delegates, it remains to be seen whether its specific recommendations will be given
effect in any of the US states, including New York. Both proponents and opponents
of MDP may seek out arenas other than the ABA House of Delegates in which to
carry on the future US debate on MDP. The result might be the adoption, but it also
might lead to the by-passing, of the recommendations of the NYSBA Report.
Positions are likely to be taken and measures are likely to be proposed along lines
congenial to the professional or economic interest groups pursuing them. Scholar-
ship, learning, and logic are grist for the writers and readers of reports, and they
appear to have contributed immeasurably to the NYSBA Report. It would be
26 The timing was in fact determined by the ABA, which fixed an 25 April 2000 deadline for
submissions to be considered by the House of Delegates in July. The NYSBA Committee
met this deadline. (The ABA Commission issued its Report and Recommendation on 12
May 2000.) The Executive Committee and the House of Delegates of the NYSBA endorsed
the NYSBA Report on, respectively, 28 April and 24 June 2000.
27 See NYSBA Report, at pp. 152-53, pp. 169-76. Ibid., at p. 369, mentions the claim by
Ernst & Young that its US affiliated law firm is separate from Ernst & Young itself. In this
connection, compare Ernst & Young, 2000 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide at Preface and
pp. 696-697 (listing the law firm of McKee Nelson, Ernst & Young LLP of Washington,
DC as a member of Ernst & Young International).
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foolhardy, however, to assume that they will necessarily control the politics and
economics of those who would control the practice of law.
C. Conclusion
Politics and economics are likely to be major forces in the future US debate on
MDP. As has been seen in the context of the Big Five, much of the debate revolves
around ownership and control of the unidisciplinary practice of law, to which non-
lawyers and non-legal entities aspire because legal practice is thought to be
profitable. Its profitability is front-page news,2 8 and would seem to justify the views
of the law and economics school, at least to the extent that law firms generate high
returns on their capital. In any event, the economics of legal practice compete for the
attention of the participants in the MDP debate, and may make for more interesting
reading than the core values of the legal profession.
The economics of legal practice (like the economics of activities in general) is
cyclical. At times when the ownership of legal practice is sufficiently profitable to
make it seem attractive to non-lawyers and entities whose primary function is not
legal practice, advocates of non-lawyer ownership of, and investment in, the
practice of law may tend to overlook possible future downturns in profitability.
They may also tend to underestimate the problems involved in transforming the
exigencies of legal practice, the complexities of legal thinking, and the
temperament of legal practitioners into profits. Economic cycles may in the
end prove to be an ephemeral foundation for legal practice, and legal
practitioners themselves may over time constitute the most stable source of
capital for the legal profession. Economic caution, however, is unlikely to deter
representatives of those schools of thought that, as a matter of doctrine (the law
and economics school) or of self-interest (the Big Five) or of perceived social need
(the ABCNY), urge that non-lawyers be permitted to own and invest in the
practice of law.
Two questions thus arise - what are the professional rules that will apply to non-
lawyers who own or otherwise control legal practices offering services to the general
public, and who will be responsible for enforcing those rules? The law and economics
school dismisses such rules as protectionist encroachments on the free marketplace.
The Big Five do not seem to accept that they themselves (as distinguished from
individual lawyers in their employ) should be subject to such rules when they are in
ultimate control of such legal practices. The ABCNY feels that the ABA should
convene a conference of concerned professionals to devise such rules on the basis of
28 See, e.g., Greg Winter, 'Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor' (2000) The
New York Times, at Al (top of page), 17 August (citing the 'rush of new business' to law
firms, and high levels of minimum annual fee-paying hours per law firm associate).
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existing rules governing the affected professions. 29 The flatly negative school would
avoid these questions altogether by simply forbidding any form of MDP.
The NYSBA Report is essentially an analytical exercise that looks for answers to
these questions in the law governing lawyers in the US. Because the other four
schools of thought, for quite different reasons, are unlikely to be satisfied by this
exercise, the NYSBA Report is open to attack on at least four fronts, and is
vulnerable to the political allies of its detractors. In particular, the Big Five may feel
challenged to create integrated MDPs in the US, rather than to shape their activities
to conform with the 'side-by-side' model of MDP proposed by the NYSBA Report
(discussed above). 30 Similarly, bar groups opposed to any form of MDP may oppose
the adoption of rules along the lines recommended by the NYSBA Report.
Moreover, even if the recommendations of the NYSBA Report are adopted, their
enforcement may prove less rigorous than the precision with which they were
drafted. All of these disclaimers having been made, however, there remains the
possibility that the NYSBA Report marks the beginning of a constructive search for
answers to the basic questions of professional ethics raised by the on-going US
debate over MDP.
29 The notion that some key to all deontologies can be found to solve the problem does not
seem to be widely shared outside the ABCNY. (In literature, a comparable quest is found
in Casaubon's search for the key to all mythologies in George Eliot's, Middlemarch.)
3o It can be noted that Donahue & Partners of Toronto, Canada, known there as the 'captive
law firm' of Ernst & Young, has opened a branch office in the Ernst & Young offices in
New York.

